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Greece and European crisis

Débordé par notre quotidien, we have not responded to the crisis in the European Union. Much has been written, so we offer here a brief overview.

A country in crisis should come out of monetary union?

Felstein recalls the conditions for a successful monetary union (workers' mobility, fiscal and political union with the ability to make transfers from one region to another).
In a situation of excessive debt, a small country with its own currency would depreciate its currency and should pay a higher interest rate to pay its expenses, but within the EU the cost is more, the country in question is trying to play the stowaway by making excessive deficits.
While some countries including Spain and Ireland have not played this game (before the crisis the budgets of these statements were balanced), Greece has undoubtedly been a free rider behavior. To pull the country out of crisis, some authors have questioned whether an output of the euro would not be beneficial.

As noted, among other Bernal , Leaving the euro and return to a national currency would have dramatic economic consequences. A country that would choose such a policy would benefit certainly a devaluation of its currency allowing it to restore its competitiveness. This adjustment would be faster than the decline in wages is at work today in Greece. But insofar as one can hardly imagine a country repay its debt denominated in euro with a devalued currency, it's a safe bet that this output of the union would be accompanied by a default (or restructuring debt). But a default, creates distrust of investors over a long period. To stem capital flight, only a higher interest rate to pay the risk premium is possible. It would limit the devaluation and thus gains in exports but also pummel her investment and ultimately the country's growth. So economically speaking out of the euro seems unthinkable, politically it is much less cons, because we can imagine quite easily populist surfing the recession, came to power with slogans of anti-European. Barry Eichengreen does not share this view, for him out of the euro is just hard to imagine politically.

analysis Stiglitz is probably one of the most original, the author follows Keynes in saying that this is not the balance of trade deficits that pose problems but surpluses. Within the European Union is therefore Germany, which exerts a negative externality, leaving the monetary union would lead to a devaluation of the euro that would restore the competitiveness of European countries in deficit . The author proposes alternatives obviously consensual. True to his beliefs, he considers that the austerity through lower wages is frivolous, and believes that if Europe can not reform its institutions and provide adequate tax structure so as to drop the euro rather than to impose on people a long agony.

Originally evil

De Grauwe recommends the establishment of a centralized budget that would allow an automatic transfer to countries in difficulty. This solidarity mechanism (insurance) would limit the use of the market. The author notes that, apart from Greece, a large part of European governments have eu des déficits limités et une croissance de la dette relativement lente en comparaison avec l’endettement privé. La crise des États, n’est que la conséquence de la crise immobilière et bancaire née en aout 2007 :



“Those who say that it is government profligacy that is the source of the debt crisis are mistaken. They also fail to see the inevitable connection between private and public debt. This connection is particularly strong in countries like Spain and Ireland that have been hit badly by the debt crisis. [...] Spain and Ireland were spectacularly successful in reducing their government debt to GDP ratios prior to the financial crisis, i.e. Spain from 60% to 40% and Ireland from 43% to 23%. These were the two countries, which followed the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact better than any other country – certainly better than Germany that allowed its government debt ratio to increase before 2007. Yet the two countries, which followed the fire code regulations most scrupulously, were hit by the fire, because they failed to contain domestic private debt.”



Tyler Cowen revient sur la corruption en Grèce, il souligne que dans les classements internationaux ce pays est proche de l'Égypte ou de Éthiopie. L’économie souterraine représenterait 20% du PIB, l’évasion fiscale semble être a national sport representing a loss of 30 billion euros of tax revenue . This difficulty in collecting the tax is worrisome for prompt repayment of debt.


Reinhart and Reinhart we queue blues by reminding us of the unsuccessful efforts of Argentina which ended in a default of 132 billion euro in 2001 and a GDP contraction of 15%. The authors further note that countries that have pursued austerity plans and it came out (in 1995 Mexico, South Korea in 1998, Turkey in 2001, Brazil in 2002) had a debt in terms of lower GDP Greece.

Solutions?

Laurence Boone talks about the issues of anti-crisis plan, this plan allows the ECB to buy back sovereign debt and grants to the European Commission borrowing capacity of 110 billion euros. Finally, a bottom 440 billion would lead to lower cost countries in difficulty.

Burda and Gerlach proposes the establishment of a committee of independent experts who follow the evolution of Member States' budgets. The new pact of stability it offers, is gradual and very demanding, with an assessment by the experts when the deficit exceeds 1% and an adjustment procedure from 2%.

Wyplosz back on the 750 billion euro provided by Member States and the IMF (which provides 250 billion), he is particularly concerned about the risk of recession-related austerity plans that would undermine tax revenues and weigh down deficit and therefore the debt.

Aglietta also considered that the austerity plan has a high probability of failure from his point of view the crisis is not a liquidity crisis but a crisis of credit against which the only solution is a debt restructuring:

"A cardinal mistake has been made, that the financing plan of 110 billion euros over three years allocated to Greece can not dissipate. The same error as that committed in 1982 by the club of sovereign creditors of Mexico was repeated. It denies that there is a solvency problem and pretends to believe that there is a transient problem of liquidity. This error in the time claimed the lost decade in Latin America as a whole. The countries were exhausted by the austerity plans imposed by sterile International Monetary Fund (IMF) to preserve the creditor banks. Only at the end of the decade with the Brady initiative that the debts were restructured, the banks have got rid of their debts with discounts and economies have been able to find the path of growth. [...] A restructuring plan reduces the cost of a default if it occurs. A study by the Bank of England showed that a country that fails without agreement with its creditors suffered production losses three times higher than countries whose debt has been restructured . "

This analysis is similar to that proposed by Mayer and Big considers that" a liquidity problem postponed Is A problem solved, to a solvency problem postponed Is A Made intractable problem. "

If want more information, see the work of De Grauwe on monetary unions (it is a classic, easy to read and exciting), the journal of literature and Betsma Giuliodori (2009) and finally Baldwin has conducted a review of published posts on vox-eu.

References

Betsma and Giuliodori (2009), The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research, Journal of Economic Literature.

De Grauwe, P (2009), The Economics of Monetary Union, 8th Edition, Oxford University Press.

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Institutions and Economic Performance-Theory of bicameralism (1) John Bates Clark Medal

After flying over the historic part of this work, covering the first five chapters, it is time to focus on four major theoretical chapters qu'Helpman selected. Dealing with very important institutional phenomena, such as choice of a bicameral parliamentary system, the relationship between civil wars and economic development, organization and incentives in the heart political parties to implement economic policies, or finally the ratchet effect of fiscal policies in a dynamic and multi-stakeholder, each chapter will be a ticket.

The choice of bicameralism: Introduction

Chapter 6 is devoted to paper and Kenneth A. Abhinay Muthoo Shepsle analyzing the interactions between the chambers parliamentary elections as often performed over time. Is defined as a bicameral political system that seeks to distinguish in a parliamentary two chambers, room "high" most often elected by indirect suffrage and a room "low", meeting traditionally elected by direct suffrage. The aim is clearly to moderate the action against the executive, the direct representatives of the people submit their decisions to the members of the Upper House, which generally represent different regions, provinces or states within a nation. Bicameralism is particularly justified in the context of a federal state, with a chamber representative of the people directly elected assembly and a representative of the various states. For example, Congress is an illustration of what constitutes political bicameralism, since it brings together two assemblies: the Senate or "upper room" consisting of two representatives from each state and the House of Representatives or "lower house" consisting of 435 representatives the U.S. population. The Senate elections are staggered in time (partial renewal every two years) while the House of Representatives re-elected simultaneously. The goal of bicameralism here is relatively clear, since the Upper House can rebalance the powers in order not to disadvantage the "small states" in the development of U.S. laws.

The interest of this analysis, both empirical and theoretical paper is to highlight the incentive effects of institutions, in a dynamic time, emphasizing balance dependent part in terms of parliamentary elections. It is obvious that the institutional structure of a State has undeniable effects on the behavior of political agents, through different degrees incentives, which are subject to problems of collective choice (see Theory of Mancur Olson). For example, a presidential or parliamentary, unicameral or bicameral, under a proportional electoral system and determines the level and composition of public spending, debt, and especially growth rates and levels of development of nations . It is an empirical point of view, an analysis that stands, although other factors obviously come into account in the analysis of economic performance is what makes all the variety of the work of 'Helpman.

The theoretical analysis and Shepsle Muthoo is an analysis of micro institutional differences, around a cake sharing between the two parliamentary chambers, taking into account the different modalities of elections (simultaneous or staggered in both bedrooms, one simultaneous, staged in the other). These differences are obviously justified by the stylized facts (U.S. Congress, Swiss Confederation, Senate and National Assembly in France).

Model theoretical assumptions

The first step is the definition of the basic model "Baseline" to analyze the effects of changing legal frameworks and economic environment. The authors therefore assume that initially two rooms are the legislature and the other, they hypothesize that for each period, the economy shows a surplus fixed and exogenous, known as the cake will be allocated among the various entities represented on the assemblies. For simplicity, the authors introduce no tax policy and taxation, nor any arbitration between private and public allocation of the cake.

The temporal structure of the model is composed of periods t = 0, 1,2,3 ... during which each chamber is composed of two legislators, each having been elected by an electoral body separate or "electoral district".
The authors pose the following hypothesis: it defines the probability that a legislator or member П is reelected, according to a principle of retrospective voting, which implies that this probability depends positively П or at least not negatively share of the pie received by the electoral district in the previous period. This probability of reelection is introduced in the model is designed by the authors in its reduced form, exogenously. The voting rules and voter behavior are not modeled in the model. Another fundamental assumption of this model is the informational imperfection in a temporal sequence. Each voter has a partial and incomplete information on what happened during past periods by former legislators. In other words, voters have limited memory on allowances previously distributed the cake and not re-elect their representatives in accordance with the allocations received recently.

Ѳ The authors pose the likelihood that a legislator is recognized and influential enough so that it can provide a breakdown of the cake which has the whole House. If his proposal is accepted, then the electoral district receives the appropriate share of the cake, if the offer is refused by the assembly in question, then any gain is lost. It also requires that if the Legislature is indifferent between acceptance or rejection of a proposed distribution, so he accepts; It is quite clear that the legislature chooses to propose an allocation that maximizes the pie allocated to its own districts.

At time t =- 1, that is to say when the development of constitutional system, it is assumed that all the conditions for elections, training meetings and decision making are commonly decided by the Founding Fathers with a view to optimizing their interests joints.

Each parliamentary chamber is in charge of the distribution of half the cake, and will Muthoo and Shepsle analyze sequentially the various electoral arrangements simultaneous or staggered. For each institutional review, the political balance achieved is a Markov equilibrium, namely that once the institutional choices made (eg choice of bicameralism) in period -1, the political strategies driven by a logic of historical independence decisions. The balance mechanism can not account for any intertemporal choice or cooperative.

What are the main results obtained?

By imposing a constraint in which the starting monocameral is chosen by the founders, the authors show that it is sometimes preferable to establish procedures for elections staggered rather than simultaneous. Indeed, from the point where elections are concurrent, ie the assembly is totally unique challenge to each election date, the probability that the elections completely renew the membership of the assembly is strongly positive, which implies little political experience in the room Parliamentary and thus a relative inefficiency of the decisions taken. As part of a phased and partial replacement, this type of scenario is impossible. In addition, the existence of a single chamber increases the risk that the legislature denied a proposal for the distribution of the cake and the electoral district does finally perceive no contribution. This last element is at the heart of the analysis the degree of risk aversion of agents.

Recall now that the basic model is a bicameral structure, which divides the cake in half. Three cases must be examined in turn: both chambers are simultaneously renewed, or both are partially re-elected, or one of two known staggered elections and not the other.

- In the first case, the model shows that a bicameral legislature with a single electoral event is a Pareto-superior if there is a single room. Bicameralism will be chosen ex ante, tending to confirm the choice of the base case, also reflecting the risk aversion of agents. Indeed, this scenario can provide a greater probability of receiving a share.
- Just as when both meetings have staggered election terms, the model shows superiority as the Pareto criterion in relation to unicameral, always on the basis of a risk aversion of agents, who prefer to maximize the likelihood of receiving a share of the cake, as form of allocation, rather than risk getting nothing.
- The third case of asymmetry of electoral conditions of the two chambers is not directly measurable through the model specification. Indeed, the optimality of either procedure depends on the value of certain parameters such that the probability of reelection of legislators (which we recall depends allocations received in previous period by each entity election) but also the likelihood of legislators to be sufficiently influential to offer themselves a division of the pie, a parameter that depends on him even elections (plus the approaching elections for some lawmakers, their means of more actions will be important).
Nevertheless, the authors argue that when the parameters are such that the power to impose an agenda for legislators is the same in the context of elections partial or total, then, agents will be indifferent to the three possible structures of bicameralism.

Conclusions

In choosing to highlight this study, Helpman seeks to emphasize the importance of institutional organization, but also incentives for policy makers. If the analysis focuses on the ex-ante choice of institutional structure, that does not link these findings to the main stylized facts that highlight the differences in economic performance related to the functioning of institutions. The cons-powers are necessary and more economic agents are risk averse, the greater the presence of two constituent rooms will be required. Muthoo and Shepsle have thus shown that under certain conditions; bicameralism is a more appropriate choice as the unicameral. Indeed, the balance achieved through a program of maximizing share of the pie is Pareto superior to equilibria reached under which a single parliamentary chamber is established. It is however important to remember that this model depends heavily on assumptions advanced by the authors and especially the value of the main parameters of the theoretical model. This recall that there is no single institutional structure which is optimal without it depends on the size and characteristics of each nation .

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Mutual: how to be sure of good mutual tariff?

It is a question that those who are still reluctant to take out supplementary health. Indeed, the assessment of insurance rates is not as obvious as that of any product. The fact that we have to pay a monthly fee makes us think and we often ask the question: Did I choose the right health insurance with the best price mutual ? This is what leads us to determine what would be the best way to have the best health insurance.

How to choose complementary health
Long before finding a mutual, we have already in mind a certain budget to spend for our health coverage. If we rely solely on the budget then the additional health we choose, may not be suited to our requirements for health. This is because for each other who practice mutual same rate, the level of coverage provided may be very different. This is so because some mutual or mutual health insurance already enjoy an excellent reputation. They can therefore afford to engage in mutual rates higher than other less well known.
Once again, budget and fee mutual health are not sufficient criteria to select our complementary health. A mutual renowned reputation and a mutual average can offer the same level of coverage and the same types of services but with different rates mutual. Best for us would be to proceed with the analysis of each option available to us and compare them carefully, taking into account our expectations for health coverage. Following this comparison, we choose the formula adapted to the coverage sought in the limit of our budget for health coverage.

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We tend to think that is essential for us to have a complementary health even if it does not really correspond to our expectations. This is one reason why we limit our maximum budget of health coverage. However, when health problems arise, we often regret not having chosen a health insurance with a mutual health rate higher for a higher level of coverage. Thus, we are obliged to pay the portion of health expenditures that our mutual does not cover. If we can afford, it is advisable to invest in complementary health approaches most of our requirements, even pay a little more. This will ensure a better satisfaction to our health coverage.