Therefore, the economic literature has increasingly examined the effects of civil wars on the economy and reverse the relationship between initial level of development, insurrections and civil wars.
Most civil wars have the same architecture, namely that it is for most guerrilla forces opposing the government, leading a counterinsurgency against the guerrillas, whose strength of attack is always a minority and illegal. Rebel forces act at night in rural areas, through targeted operations, while the army acts day in urban areas. In other words, there is no physical confrontation between two camps, but only a game designed to spread terror among opponents and to generate more membership and financial support of the population and local businesses. Indeed, the taxes collected by the rebels and the government are the only valid sources of funding and an effective way to undermine the other side via a reduction of the tax base available. This is the pattern that was observed in Vietnam, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Algeria, Philippines, Turkey, Peru, Northern India, Thailand, Kashmir, Nepal, Indonesia, Mozambique, Sudan ... In these examples, the reader finds self-correlation between income per head relatively small country and the likelihood of occurrence of such conflicts. Fearon even shows the relative per capita income in explaining how civil wars, demonstrating that once controlled the initial earnings, the degree of democracy, religious diversity, ethnic groups or the degree of inequality n have virtually no explanatory power. Fearon seeks to answer two questions:
- How to explain the historical persistence of this type of internal conflict, very characteristic since 1945? The underlying question is: what that would prevent negotiations between government and rebel forces, causing collateral damage considerable economic and human?
- What explains the strong relationship between low per capita income and high risk of war?
Fearon seeks to resolve these issues by adapting game theory to this context, both players are the government and the rebel leader. It will demonstrate the relative ineffectiveness of previous models seen in the economics literature (Grossman 1991, 2002, Hirshleifer 1995, Skaperdas 1992). Indeed, unlike his predecessors, James Fearon included a component of violence in his model that integrates the fact that as part of a guerrilla war (which we shall call between the armed forces unbalanced), the risk to the guerrillas triggering the fighting is important: it implies a probability of detection and capture much larger, which eventually end up down the rebellion by capturing all the fighters. On the other hand, the imbalance between military and rebels is inevitable as more rebels enlisting men, the greater the risk of infiltration is high: Fearon talks about diminishing returns of the rebel forces in a successful insurgency.
models literature applied to civil wars.
is considered a game, both players are the government (G) and rebel leader (R) that interact in society in which income per head is there, each with a positive return (y> 0). Potential tax revenue for which they are written ty with y is income per capita and t the tax rate set. The game begins with the recruitment of men in proportion α ε [0,1] by the rebel leader and as a proportion β ε [0,1] by the army chief, the choice of α and β are being simultaneously, the marginal cost and cR cG. Under these models, the function that determines the success of the insurgency (measured in terms of share of tax revenues controlled by the rebels) is written p (α, mβ) for a fixed level of military forces employed and m a positive parameter of efficiency-led insurgency against government forces.
The utility functions of both players are written:
UR (α, β) = p (α, mβ). ty. (1 - α-β) - α cR
UG (α, β) = (1 - p (α, mβ)). ty. (1 - α-β) - cG β
The basic assumption in combating both utility functions we consider is that having more than enlisted soldiers or rebels, the number of opponents is constant gives allows for greater tax revenues ( dp / dα> 0), through a descending rate of return (d ² p / dα \u0026lt;0).
analysis of these utilities is needed to understand how variation in per capita income (Approximated here by y) will affect the equilibrium level of civil conflict, themselves determined by maximizing utility functions of G and R. Here Fearon will show the ineffectiveness of these models, which arrive at a conclusion irrelevant in terms of stylized facts. Indeed, if y is income increases, the marginal returns of each of rebellion or insurrection-cons will increase by raising the tax base. Now if α and β are the equilibrium levels before rising incomes, while increasing company when, because of diminishing returns the number of male combatants to capture new tax revenues, while the share of men fighting in the respective Ramées rebels and the government will be more important. Which is very unrealistic as it is tantamount to saying that when a country becomes richer, it is more advantageous for him to engage in civil war, involving a share of the larger population. In a second plane, another limitation is housed in the specification of marginal costs of recruitment and military rebels. Indeed, when income y increases, the costs and cR cG remain constant, which amounts to asserting that house and feed launder soldiers would have the same cost regardless living standards.
In this perspective, an alternative specification was proposed: rather than assuming that the requisition is being hired for a salary that players R and G to perform. The wage then encourages men to engage in civil war, partly displacing the risk of dying by a financial non-negligible since the wage w is equal to or greater than the infinitesimal per capita income y As a result, revenues are varied within the population with yi following a cumulative distribution function, denoted by F. If the shape of the function is not impacted by a variation of the average per capita income, while the living still not affect the marginal costs and hence the equilibrium levels of the attacking forces of the two adversaries. This assumption allows any event to include in the model that income inequality is a source of encouragement in the level of equilibrium. But the specification of the model in its reduced form does not get results with accommodating the reality of the guerrillas in poor countries. Moreover, Fearon said that the chances of civil war are not empirically higher in unequal countries. These models literature do not really explain the relationship between such conflicts and income per head.
Mafia, Guerrillas what difference?
As a transition from literature to its own model, Fearon analyzes the differences between criminals and mafia group of rebels. Indeed, it seems obvious that the criminals in their most common sense seeking to exercise their crimes and crime in anonymity to avoid legal responsibility and punishment. In fact, criminals never repeat the same crime on the same individuals and / or in the same places to prevent their destruction. Mafias in contrast, are criminal organizations who are not acting in secret. Indeed, in order to capture rents and taxes on the backs of taxpayers, they do know the population and therefore likely termination. What allows them to persist over time? On the one hand, the very hierarchical organization, which allows the exercise of control over each member and other threats of retaliation and the exercise of terror on the topics to limit the risk of termination with the authorities. It is the same for an organization rebels, who finance themselves through taxes "revolutionary" punctured the peasants mainly in rural areas and exposed to the risk of being known and denounced the government. The fundamental difference between mafia and rebellion is that crime does not have the same goal. A civil war is primarily carried out for a radical change of system politique.En addition, an insurgency is most often reduced in number and armed forces compared to government forces, so it is necessary to stay in the underground to survive. Indeed, Fearon's model based on the assumption following the addition of rebels recruited increases the risk of capture and jeopardizing any armed group, for a given size of government.
A model of insurgency
Fearon again considers a game between the head of government (the size of the army β ε [0,1]) and rebels ( size of the insurgency α ε [0,1]), each puncturing taxes on private income, a rate fixed t ε [0,1]. The total tax revenue amounted to ty (1-α-β) with y the per capita income (times the population not enrolled in combat).
The model predicts that a fraction p (α, mβ) rebel was captured or killed by the military government, with the parameter m> 0, the parameter of efficiency of government in the insurgency-cons. So that the size of the rebel group is written α (1-p (α, mβ), which collects its revolutionary taxes on the part of the population not involved in the conflict.
Total revenue for the rebel s written now tyα (1 - p (α, mβ)). The government collects its taxes on farmers' income not "controlled" by the rebels, that workers who do not support the insurgency.
Fearon's model differs from the literature by the introduction of p (α, mβ), reflecting the risk of capture by the rebels, increasing function of its two arguments, namely the size of the armed group (growing risk of termination ) and the effectiveness of government in the conflict. The proportion of captured rebels is equal to α. p (α, mβ) = k (α, mβ)
Both utility functions are written in this
UR (α, β) = tymin {(1 - α-β, α-k (α-mβ)} - α cR
Where rebel leader sets a tax rate, minimizing the risk of capture of his troops
UG (α, β) = {tymax (0.1 - α-β-α-k (α-mβ)} - β cG
And the head of the government sets its tax rate, maximizing its tax base and capture of rebels.
- If the rebels are too few, α αmin below, then the government has no incentive to employ armed forces against the insurgency. The best answer is β = 0.
- Once the size of the guerrilla exceeds the threshold α αmin above, the government has a major interest to engage in the insurgency-cons, because the rebels capture a significant share of the tax base
- Considering the best response of the rebels, two contradictory forces interact: first, the willingness to fund and generate financial support for a greater share of the population, and also stress the risk of termination .
Once the model is explained, a fundamental question remains? What is the relationship with per capita income and level of development of a country? Indeed, the question is starting to question the balance of civil conflict in poor countries. Fearon two arguments:
- Revenues did not make any difference in the model because of course, a larger tax base represents a positive incentive for governments to combat insurgents, but this involves costs e running much higher (hires, Stewardship ...)
- Political aspects, developing countries are most affected by gaps in political systems, pushing the rebellion of a portion of the population. Finally
Fearon says that one can not theoretically prove the relationship between poor countries and civil wars without assuming that the populations and combatants would be more risk averse in rich countries, suffering an opportunity cost to engage in the fight much harder because of their initial standard of living. According
Fearon, model parameters representing the efficiency of the government to conduct an insurgency-cons and the share of national income that can be taken by the guerrillas, used to announce the first answers. In fact, according to the stylized facts, these parameters would have a much higher probability of being strong in poor countries. Thus, the equilibrium "violent" (α *, β *) highlighted by Fearon has a higher probability of being reached within a poorly developed countries.
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